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ROBERTS V. TISHMAN SPEYER
PROPERTIES: A SOURCE OF FALSE HOPE
FOR LOW-INCOME VICTIMS OF
PREDATORY EQUITY
William Spirer*
INTRODUCTION
On the evening of October 16, 2006, the broker charged
with selling Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village (“Stuy
1
Town”) called Rob Speyer of Tishman Speyer Properties. The
broker instructed Speyer to gather BlackRock Inc., Tishman
Speyer’s partner in its bid to buy Stuy Town, as well as his
team of bankers and lawyers, and rush over to her office,
entering the building in groups of two in order to remain
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011; B.A. Bates College,
2004. I would like to thank my family for their ongoing support and
encouragement. Thanks to Kathleen Christatos, Jill Wexler, Sarah Castle and
Jon Sabin, as well as the entire Journal of Law and Policy staff, for their
edits and assistance throughout the writing process. Finally, I owe a debt of
gratitude to Marty Needelman and Joanne Koslofsky for introducing me to
the world of New York City housing law and to Professor David Reiss, who
generously offered me his time and invaluable insights.
1
The specifics of this deal were originally reported by Charles V. Bagli
in the New York Times. Charles V. Bagli, Megadeal: Inside a New York
Real Estate Coup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/business/yourmoney/31speyer.html
[hereinafter Megadeal]. Rob Speyer is the son of, and heir apparent to, Jerry
Speyer, the CEO of Tishman Speyer Properties, a preeminent property
developer and owner, and was the Tishman Speyer representative in charge
of the deal. Id.; Charles DuBow, The World’s Biggest Real Estate Deal,
BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 18, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
bwdaily/dnflash/content/oct2006/db20061017_682643.htm?chan=top+news_t
op+news+index_businessweek+exclusives.
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inconspicuous.2 The next morning, the Tishman Speyer
Properties and BlackRock Inc. partnership (“the Owners”)
completed the biggest real estate deal of all time, making a $400
million deposit on a $5.4 billion dollar deal for 110 buildings
and 11,232 apartments on 80 acres of prime Manhattan land.3
The deal attracted significant publicity.4 The sale, forged at the
apex of the housing boom, offered bidders a rare opportunity in
Manhattan’s tight real estate market: to acquire a huge number
of apartments where rents were only a third to a half of market
rates, thus leaving room for the owner to significantly increase
the rent.5 Across the city, Stuy Town tenants and tenant
advocates feared the apartments would be rapidly removed from
rent regulation, legally and illegally, because doing so would be
the only possible way to ultimately turn a profit on the deal.6
The transaction represented a new breed of real estate deals,
dubbed “predatory equity” transactions because the deals are
backed by private equity.7 Predatory equity means investing
2

Megadeal, supra note 1.
DuBow, supra note 1. The record price before this $5.4 billion
purchase had been approximately $1.9 billion, when Tishman Speyer
purchased Rockefeller Center. Id.; Megadeal, supra note 1. There were eight
other bidders who competed for the Stuy Town deal. Megadeal, supra note
1. A tenant coalition was one of the bidders, offering $4.5 billion and
promising to preserve 20 percent of the units as rent-regulated rentals while
selling 20 percent to tenants at below-market prices. Id.
4
Megadeal, supra note 1. Some bidders believed the deal to be too big
to sustain itself and warned that the overleveraged terms of the deal could
haunt the Tishman Speyer/BlackRock partnership in the future. Id. Tenant
activists, for their part, worried that the $500,000 per apartment purchase
price would require the new owners to aggressively move to deregulate
apartments and raise rents. Id. Both the critics’ and the tenants’ prophesies
ultimately came true. See Lingling Wei & Craig Karmin, An Apartment
Complex Teeters, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at M12, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125547827547583747.html?mod=rss_Today’
s_Most_Popular.
5
Megadeal, supra note 1.
6
David Jones, Predatory Equity, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 17, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-jones/predatory-equity_b_289172.html.
7
TOM WATERS & VICTOR BACH, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y OF N.Y., CLOSING
THE DOOR 2008: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING LOSSES IN A WEAKENED MARKET 9
3
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equity to buy rental apartments at inflated prices with the
intention of replacing low- and middle-income tenants with new
tenants who can afford much higher rents, thus enabling the
investors to earn large profits.8 New York City’s housing
advocates and elected officials believe this speculative practice9
threatens the city’s affordable housing stock10 and they have
worked to oppose the practice.11In New York, predatory equity
has already put vast numbers of apartments at risk of being
removed from rent regulation protections. Ninety thousand
units12 of affordable, rent regulated housing have already been
purchased by predatory equity purchasers and removing these
(2008),
http://www.cssny.org/userimages/downloads/CSS_Report_Closing
TheDoor_08.pdf. Private equity firms essentially engage in leveraged buyouts, using borrowed money to buy what they deem to be undervalued assets,
improve the assets and sell them for profit. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, Profits
for Buyout Firms as Company Debt Soared, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/business/economy/05
simmons.html.
8
TOM WATERS, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y OF N.Y., GETTING STARTED ON
PREDATORY EQUITY RESEARCH IN YOUR CITY (2009), http://www.cssny.
org/userimages/downloads/Getting%20Started%20on%20Predatory%20Equity
%20Research%20in%20Your%20City%20May%202009.pdf.
9
These deals are “speculative” because the purchase prices and
mortgages of the apartments are based on what the rent rolls ultimately might
be able to support, not what they currently support. See infra Part I.A.
10
New York, as one of the few American cities that has a large amount
of rent regulated apartments, provides investors with a unique opportunity to
profit from the predatory model. Gretchen Morgenson, Questions of Rent
Tactics by Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/business/09rent.html?pagewanted=all.
Rent regulated apartments make up 57 percent of Bronx apartments, 42
percent of Brooklyn apartments, 59 percent of Manhattan apartments, 43
percent of Queens apartments and 15 percent of Staten Island apartments. Id.
11
WATERS & BACH, supra note 7, at 12, 33. On December 2, 2009,
New York City announced the formation of a “Predatory Equity Task Force”
to monitor issues related to the burst of the housing bubble as they arise and
mobilize to protect tenants when necessary. Press Release, N.Y. City
Council, Council Announces New Predatory Equity Task Force Following
Sale of Ocelot Portfolio (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://council.nyc.gov/
html/releases/equity_tf_12_2_09.shtml.
12
In this Comment “apartment” and “unit” will be used interchangeably.
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units from the rent regulation scheme is at the heart of the
predatory equity business model.13
In many ways, the Stuy Town deal exemplifies the predatory
equity model and illustrates the high stakes involved for
landlords and tenants.14 By 2008, following the housing bubble
burst and the concurrent global economic downturn, Stuy
Town’s investors’ worst fears came true: the complex was in
danger of imminent default.15 On October 22, 2009, in Roberts
v. Tishman Speyer Properties, the New York Court of Appeals
added to the Owners’ financial problems.16 The court ruled that
the Owners17 had improperly removed thousands of units from
rent regulation and charged market rates while simultaneously
receiving tax abatements from New York City through the “J-51
program.”18 Reaction from interested parties has been swift: Pro13

ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., THE NEXT SUB-PRIME
LOAN CRISIS: HOW PREDATORY EQUITY INVESTMENT IS UNDERMINING NEW
YORK’S AFFORDABLE MULTI-FAMILY RENTAL HOUSING 2, 4 (2008)
http://www.anhd.org/resources/the%20next%20sub-prime%20loan%20crisis.
pdf [hereinafter NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS]. One housing developer
explains the scale of predatory equity: “During the past four years nearly one
tenth of the entire rent regulated housing stock in New York City was bought
by institutional investors, which is the equivalent of housing for one-third of
the population of Washington, D.C. or Boston.” Donald P. Cogsville,
Affordable Housing: Private Equity Solution to Predatory Equity, 55 REAL
EST. WKLY. (2008), available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/
article/191645824.html.
14
There are, however, critical differences between the Stuy Town deal
and other predatory equity deals. See infra Part I.C.
15
Wei & Karmin, supra note 4. The Owners have since defaulted—on
Monday, January 25, 2010, they announced that they would return the
property to their creditors. Charles V. Bagli, New York Housing Complex is
Turned Over to Creditors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/nyregion/25stuy.html?dbk.
16
See generally Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d
900, 902 (N.Y. 2009).
17
Defendants in the case included Stuy Town’s former owners as well:
Metropolitan Life and Annuity Company and Metropolitan Tower Life
Insurance Company (“Former Owners”). Id.
18
Id. The “J-51” program provides tax abatements to owners who
renovate or rehabilitate their properties in certain ways. N.Y. CITY, N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE § 11-242 (2008); see infra Part II.B.

SPIRER REVISED.DOC

6/28/2010 3:43 PM

ROBERTS V. TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES

859

tenant groups call the decision correct and highlight the injustice
resulting from years of improper interpretation of the statutes at
issue.19 Pro-landlord voices, on the other hand, cite the
decision’s unfairness, given that landlords, housing agencies and
tenants merely followed the rules—now deemed to be illegal—
for many years.20 One thing, however, is clear: this landmark
19

Nicholas Jahr, A Matter of Interpretation: How Will Court View J-51?,
CITY LIMITS WKLY., June. 22, 2009, available at http://www.citylimits.org/
content/articles/viewarticle.cfm?articlenumber=3764.
20
A Daily News editorial is reflective of opposition to the decision:
Housing agencies wrote volumes of regulations based on the plain
sense of the law. Thousands of landlords invested in residential
buildings based on the regulatory decrees. Millions of tenants signed
leases that were based on the same understanding. And the state
Legislature reauthorized vacancy decontrol by adjusting its economic
terms and leaving the word “become” intact.
....
. . . [T]he court has established that it is blithely willing to hammer
business people and property owners who invested billions of dollars
in residential properties and took out mortgages based on the rent
rules as the regulations were officially interpreted.
Editorial, A Court Out of Control: Jurists Impose Their Screwy Judgment on
City’s Rent Rules, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2009, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2009/11/02/2009-11-02_a_court_out_
of_control_jurists_impose_their_screwy_judgment_on_citys_rent_rules.html.
The real estate industry, however, appeared to be selling two conflicting
storylines in the immediate aftermath of the decision. On the one hand, they
spoke of it as a doomsday scenario: Steven Spinola, president of the Real
Estate Board of New York said, “It’s a terrible decision” and explained that,
“[t]his is another example of rent regulations basically throwing a little bit of
havoc and a little bit of fear into property owners and financial institutions.”
Lingling Wei & Dawn Wotapka, Court Shakes up New York Landlords,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2009, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB125622172790601315.html. On the other hand, the industry
appeared to try and play down the repercussions of the decision, almost as if
to contain the fall-out. One article, sardonically titled “Shock! Landlords Will
Survive Stuy-Town Verdict” quoted the very same Mr. Spinola as saying,
“It’s certainly bad for [some], but it’s not a decision that will affect tens of
thousands of apartments.” Theresa Agovino & Amanda Fung, Landlords Will
Survive Stuy-Town Verdict!, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Oct. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20091023/FREE/910239986
[hereinafter Landlords Will Survive Stuy-Town Verdict] (alteration in
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decision will have far-reaching implications for a group of New
York City tenants and landlords of buildings that have been
removed from rent regulation while the landlords received J-51
tax breaks from the city. The critical question, then, is just how
far-reaching this decision’s implications will ultimately be.21
This Comment argues that, while the Roberts decision
represents a significant victory for tenants whose landlords have
simultaneously taken advantage of the deregulation benefits and
J-51 tax abatements, it will ultimately have very little impact on
ending predatory equity practices. Despite tenants’ hopes to the
contrary, the Roberts decision does not indicate a populist, antiWall Street trend on the part of the courts, but rather a ruling
limited to a very narrow issue of statutory interpretation.22 In
fact, despite a number of events that would seem to deter
predatory equity investment,23 this model persists, albeit in a
original).
21
Theresa Agovino & Amanda Fung, Court Hands Stuy Town Tenants
Huge Victory, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www.
crainsnewyork.com/article/20091022/FREE/910229993/1072
[hereinafter
Court Hands Stuy Town Tenants Huge Victory].
22
Daniel Geiger, In the End, J-51 Case Came Down to the Interpretation
of Just a Few Words, REAL EST. WKLY., Oct. 23, 2009, available at
http://www.rew-online.com/news/story.aspx?id=776. Real estate experts
believe that there may be a maximum of 80,000 units where the owners have
taken advantage of J-51 benefits, while simultaneously deregulating their
apartments. Id. Other industry experts put the number at 90,000. NEXT SUBPRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 2. Moreover, only 27,708 of these
80,000 or 90,000 apartments are in buildings considered to be current victims
of predatory equity deals. See supra note 19.
23
These factors include the Roberts decision; an active tenant rights
movement, Linda Collins, Tenants of Brooklyn Apartments Protest
Conditions, Harassment, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Nov. 3, 2009, available
at http://www.brooklyneagle.com/categories/category.php?id=31704; the
passage of a tenant protection law in New York City, see Prometheus Realty
v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10, 2009, at 38, (col. 1); political
pressure, Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Reveals: SoCalled “Predatory Equity” Deals Just Like Subprime Loans but for Entire
NYC Housing Complexes—Developers Cook the Books to Reap Millions and
Leave Tenants in the Lurch (Dec. 2, 2008), available at http://schumer.
senate.gov/new_website/record.cfm?id=305397; and fallout in the mortgagebacked securities market, Sam Chandan, Investors and Stuy Town, N.Y.
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modified form.24 This new form is characterized by deals that
are still speculative but merely less so than the deals made at the
height of the housing bubble.25 Ultimately, ending this dangerous
speculative model will require much stronger comprehensive
regulation, at the state or national level, that prevents future
deals from being made, or the removal of the incentives—like
luxury decontrol—that allow developers to rapidly raise rents to
market rate.26
In this Comment, Part I will introduce the recent
phenomenon of predatory equity, a real estate trend necessary
for understanding the Roberts decision, and its implications. Part
II will provide an overview of relevant law concerning New
York City’s complex and overlapping rent regulation and tax
abatement schemes. Part III will evaluate the opinion of the
Roberts court, with a particular focus on whether the case was
properly decided. Finally, Part IV will provide a detailed
analysis of the Roberts decision’s potential implications on
predatory equity practices in New York City.
I. PREDATORY EQUITY: A NEW MODEL FOR MULTIFAMILY27
APARTMENT TRANSACTIONS
A. Underlying Financial Model
In order to understand the Roberts decision in context, it is
helpful to consider the structure of a predatory equity deal.
OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 2009, available at http://neptune.observer.com/2009/
commercial-observer/investors-and-stuy-town#.
24
ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., PREDATORY EQUITY:
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS 20–22 (2009), available at http://www.anhd.org/
resources/Predatory_Equity-Evolution_of_a_Crisis_Report.pdf
[hereinafter
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS]. “Vulture funds,” which are investment funds that
deal with distressed assets, appear poised to take advantage of investment
opportunities in the New York City multifamily housing market as banks sell
off predatory equity debt at discount prices. Id; see infra, Part III.B.
25
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24.
26
WATERS & BACH, supra note 7, at 12–13.
27
The term “multifamily” apartment refers to an apartment building that
contains multiple apartment units.
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Predatory equity deals involve buying rental apartments at prices
not supported by the income produced from rent at the time of
sale, in hopes of aggressively removing apartments from rent
regulation, raising rents to market rates and increasing the
building’s profit-making potential.28 Poor underwriting standards
and the securitization of debt characterize these deals.29 Tenant
advocates criticize the underwriting terms for these mortgagebacked securities as being risky, not conforming to industry
standards, and requiring the property owner to double or triple
the rent in order to cover the debt service.30 The problem with
this model, explains a director of the bond-rating agency
Realpoint, is that “[t]he apartments are just not generating
revenues anywhere close to market rents. Yet, they were
underwritten as if they were.”31 Property owners, then, must
aggressively replace rent regulated tenants with those that can
pay market rates.32 Still, securitization fails to discourage lenders
from making risky loans because it allows private equity
28

WATERS, supra note 8.
Securitization refers to “the process by which a mortgage lender
bundles together a large group of mortgages and sells certificates in that
group of mortgages to investors.” NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note
13, at 4–5.
30
Id. at 6. The term “debt service” refers, in this case, to the owners’
monthly mortgage payments. Investipedia.com, Debt Service, http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/d/debtservice.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
31
Charles V. Bagli, Mortgage Crisis is Foreseen in Housing Owned by
Private Equity Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/nyregion/06default.html.
32
NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 5–8. The term sheets
outline a “recapturing” strategy, where the property owner must convert
regulated apartments into market rate units in order to pay the debt service.
Id. at 6. In a prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for a group of buildings that one developer, Vantage Properties, owns
in Washington Heights, the underwriting terms read, “[Vantage Properties]
anticipates to recapture approximately 20–30% of the units [within the first
year], and 10% a year thereafter” to afford the debt service on its loan. Id. at
5 (first alteration added). This is problematic because the annual rate of
turnover for rent-regulated buildings is only 5.6% according to the Rent
Guidelines Board and only 1% of the apartments in these buildings were
vacant when the loan was made. Id.
29
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companies to quickly recover the value of the loan and pass the
risk of default to the security investors.33
B. Impact on Renters
Typically, New York’s residential real estate in workingclass neighborhoods is a fairly non-liquid asset that returns a 7–
8% per year rate of profit, which makes it a relatively lowpressure, low-competition business.34 When private equity funds
invest in an asset, however, they must offer a competitive rate
of return—14%–20% annually.35 In the residential real estate
rental context, this rate is impossible to return without forcing
out tenants who pay below-market rents.36 Accordingly, legal
service providers and tenant advocates have reported drastic
increases in tenant harassment in predatory equity buildings.37
New York City responded to the crisis and passed Local Law 7,
which provides tenants with a new, explicit cause of action in
Housing Court for harassment.38
33

Id. at 4–5, 8. Of the 90,000 New York City units recently purchased
by private equity-backed developers, principal mortgage loans have been
securitized in about 40% of them. Id. at 5.
34
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 7.
35
Id.
36
Morgenson, supra note 10. To give just one example, Vantage
Properties, which recently paid over $1 billion to invest in 9,500 rentregulated apartments in New York City, filed almost one thousand cases in
housing court against tenants in a seventeen month period, as compared to
previous landlords who had never filed more than 350 actions in a year. Id.
37
NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 2–4. Harassment
strategies include: notifying tenants that their leases are being canceled,
alleging that they sublet the apartments illegally, wrongfully suing tenants
multiple times for unpaid rent, and erroneously claiming that tenants had
never paid their security deposits despite having lived in the building for
decades. Id. at 3–4. Compounding the impact of the high numbers of legal
actions pursued by these owners, most tenants who are sued are not
represented by counsel. Id. at 2. This has led many tenants to sign away their
rights to remain in their apartment or dispute the charges against them. Id.
38
Prometheus Realty v. City of New York, No. 111132/08, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 10, 2009, at 38 (col. 1). Local Law No. 7 amends Article 1 § 272004(a) to add a definition of harassment, § 27-2005 to make it an explicit
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The overleveraged nature of predatory equity deals causes
landlords to default and can lead to foreclosure.39 A Deutsche
Bank report predicts that the commercial real estate
“‘refinancing crisis’ will reach an unprecedented level around
2013, as loans that were made during the boom in 2005, 2006
and 2007 mature and are unlikely to qualify for refinancing
without substantial infusions of equity.”40 Rafael Cestero, the
commissioner of the Department of Housing Preservation and
Development (“HPD”), testified before a New York City
Council Committee, that a “small but significant portion” of
recently
purchased
multifamily
buildings
are
likely
overleveraged, meaning their rent does not generate enough
income to repay the debt.41 Moreover, when a building goes into
foreclosure, entire neighborhoods are affected.42 Therefore, the
legal, financial and housing sectors have closely scrutinized Stuy
Town’s struggles; it could be a harbinger of the fate of other
buildings with similar financial structures.43

duty of owners not to harass their tenants and § 27-2115 to create a cause of
action for harassment in housing court and to specify penalties for
harassment. Id. at 2. The law was upheld when faced with a constitutional
challenge by the landlord lobby, with New York State Supreme Court Judge
Eileen Rakower calling the Act “a rational legislative response to what the
City Council has determined is the potential for a growing problem of tenant
harassment in New York City.” Id. at 5.
39
THE NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 7.
40
Daniel Massey, Bronx is Burning Over Failed Deals, CRAIN’S N.Y.
BUS., Aug. 17, 2009, at 18.
41
Manny Fernandez & Jennifer Lee, Struggling Landlords Leaving
Repairs Undone, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/07/15/nyregion/15buildings.html. At the time this
statement was made, 3,200 units in affordable housing complexes had already
gone into foreclosure, 11,000 faced imminent foreclosure and potentially
55,000 more units were thought to be overleveraged and in danger of
foreclosure. Massey, supra note 40, at 2.
42
Massey, supra note 40, at 2.
43
See Gretchen Morgenson, All Those Little Stuyvesant Towns, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
01/31/business/31gret.html.
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C. Case Study: Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village
In many ways, the Stuy Town deal embodies the predatory
equity phenomenon: It was sold to private equity-backed
investors, the purchase price was exorbitant given the asset’s
cash-generating potential at the time of sale and the owners
planned to proactively remove tenants they deemed to be illegal
in order to deregulate the apartments and raise the rents to
market rate.44 However, the Stuy Town deal is also atypical in
many ways. First, the apartment complex is famous, historic and
located on prime Manhattan real estate.45 Alternatively, many
predatory equity properties are located in low-income
neighborhoods in the outer boroughs, which means that they are
not eligible to be removed from rent regulation because their
rents have not reached the $2,000 mark.46 Second, the complex
residents are decidedly middle class, as opposed to the uniformly
low-income population that inhabits most predatory equity
buildings.47 Stuy Town’s socioeconomic composition has enabled
it to retain counsel, pursue litigation and even make a
reasonable, albeit losing, bid for the properties when it came up
for sale.48 Third, a New York City Councilman, Daniel
44

Megadeal, supra note 1.
For all of the [Stuy Town] deal’s accolades, it also illuminates the
financial leaps of faith that real estate buyers are increasingly taking.
Once, buyers priced properties based on existing cash flow. Real
estate executives say that calculus would have generated a
$3.5 billion price for the two Manhattan complexes that Tishman
Speyer bought. But buyers are now looking to the future, building
models of anticipated cash flow when determining how much to bid.
The Stuyvesant Town deal, with its $5.4 billion price tag, reflects
the new math . . . .
Id.
45

Id.
WATERS & BACH, supra note 7, at 11; see infra Part III.C.
47
Id.
48
Eliot Brown, Stuy Town’s Columbus: How a Lawyer Rediscovered an
Arcane Rent Rule and Shook New York, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 27, 2009,
available
at
http://www.observer.com/2009/real-estate/stuy-town’scolumbus#.
46
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Garodnick, lives in Stuy Town, providing it with a direct
legislative advocate.49 These differences are important to
consider when analyzing the Roberts decision’s potential
reverberations.
II. ROBERTS V. TISHMAN SPEYER PROPERTIES: THE DECISION
The Roberts decision has placed all predatory equity
buildings in New York under greater scrutiny and the Stuy
Town purchase is reflective of the predatory equity model.
Therefore, despite Stuy Town’s atypical attributes, it is
important to consider the effect the Roberts decision may have
on the practice of predatory equity citywide.
A. Overview and Facts
On October 22, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals
issued a 4-2 per curiam decision that, in affirming the Appellate
Division decision, shook the real estate industry in New York
City, delighted tenants and their advocates and appeared to have
far-reaching implications on the New York rental market for
50
years to come. At its most basic level, the court found that the
Stuy Town owners improperly removed thousands of units from
rent regulation while simultaneously receiving J-51 tax benefits.51
Long before the Stuy Town sale, in 1992, the Former
Owners began receiving J-51 benefits.52 Then, after the Rent
49

Jim Dwyer, What to Make of a Big Deal Gone Sour, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2009, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/
nyregion/04about.html?scp=5&sq=garodnick&st=cse.
50
Bendix Anderson, The Complex That Just Became More So, CITY
LIMITS WKLY., Oct. 26, 2009, available at http://www.citylimits.org/content/
articles/viewarticle.cfm?article_id=3827&content_type=1&media_type=3;
Charles V. Bagli, Impact of Ruling in Stuyvesant Town Case Could Take
Years to Determine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at A17, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/nyregion/24stuytown.html [hereinafter
Impact of Ruling]; Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3.
51
Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3.
52
See Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 902
(N.Y. 2009).
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Regulation Reform Act (RRRA) was enacted in 1993, the
Former Owners attained approval from the New York City
Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) and
began charging market-rate rents for apartments that were
eligible for luxury decontrol.53 In October of 2007, the
complexes were sold to the Owners in a “top-of-the-market”
deal for $5.4 billion.54
Soon after the closing of the deal, nine plaintiff-tenants
(“Tenants”) sued the Owners and Former Owners, (hereinafter
referred to collectively as “the Owners” in the context of
Roberts).55 The Tenants sued on behalf of a putative class of all
current and former tenants who were charged, or would be
charged, rents that exceeded the legal rent stabilization level at
any time when the landlord was receiving J-51 real estate tax
benefits.56 The tenants claimed that the Owners did not have a
right to enjoy the benefits of rent deregulation while
simultaneously receiving nearly $25 million in J-51 tax
benefits.57 The Tenants asked the court for a declaration that the
units remain rent stabilized until the J-51 tax benefits were
scheduled to end, in 2017 or 2018. In addition, they sought a
declaration that the Owners would follow the law when
deregulating units and $215 million of relief in the form of rent
overcharges and attorneys’ fees.58

53

See id. Luxury decontrol refers to removing an apartment from the
rent stabilization scheme and allowing an owner to charge market rates. See
infra Part II.B.
54
Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3.
55
Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 902.
56
Id. The lawyers have since agreed to allow the case to proceed as a
class action. Ilaina Jonas & Andre Grenon, Stuyvesant Town Owners Agree to
Class Action Suit, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSN0319361720100204.
57
Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 902. Tenants claimed that 4,400 of the 11,227
apartments were illegally removed from rent stabilization and, thereafter,
illegally subject to market rate rents. Impact of Ruling, supra note 50.
58
Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 904.
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B. Relevant Rent Regulation and Housing Tax Abatement
Law
The Roberts court called the New York State rent laws “an
impenetrable thicket, confusing not only to laymen but to
lawyers.”59 Below is a brief history of relevant rent regulation
laws and their interplay with the New York City J-51 tax
program, intended to provide the necessary background for
understanding the Roberts decision.
There are two statutory structures that interact in the Roberts
case: The New York City Rent Stabilization Law (RSL)60 and
the J-51 tax program.61 The RSL was enacted in response to
62
decreasing vacancy rates and rising rents and is administered
63
by DHCR, which promulgates regulations called the Rent
Stabilization Code (RSC).64 The J-51 tax program65 provides
59

Id. at 913.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11 (2000).
61
New York, N.Y., Code § 11-242 (2009).
62
History of the Board and the Rent Regulation System, http://www.
housingnyc.com/html/about/intro%20PDF/historyoftheboard.pdf, 29 (last
visited Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter History of the Board]; Robin Reisig, Rent
Regulation, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 2003, available at http://www.
gothamgazette.com/article/iotw/20030309/200/305.
63
About Office of Rent Administration Operations and Services,
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, http://www.dhcr.state.ny.us/
Rent/about.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
64
Guy McPherson, Note, It’s the End of the World As We Know It (And
I Feel Fine): Rent Regulation in New York City and the Unanswered
Questions of Market and Society, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1148 (2004).
Buildings with six or more units that were constructed between February 1,
1974 and January 1, 1974 are subject to rent stabilization. Id. at 1148.
DHCR promulgated and adopted the RSC in 1987; it applies to housing
accommodations subject to regulation under the RSL. N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11 (2000).
65
The J-51 program is codified in § 11-242 of the NYC Administrative
Code. Harold M. Shultz, Court of Appeals Delivers Final Word on Stuy
Town, INSIDE EDGE, (Citizens Hous. & Planning Council, New York, N.Y.),
Nov. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.chpcny.org/pubs/Court%20of%20
Appeals%20Decides%20Stuy%20Town.pdf [hereinafter Final Word on Stuy
Town].
60
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incentives to landlords to make certain improvements on their
properties by promising them tax breaks.66 New York City’s
HPD administers the J-51 program.67
In 1993, the state legislature passed the RRRA, which
amended the RSL.68 The RRRA enacted “luxury decontrol,”
which refers to methods for “deregulating” a rent stabilized
apartment and allows owners to charge market rates.69 “High
rent high income” decontrol allows an owner to remove an
apartment from the rent stabilization scheme when the rent is
more than $2,000 per month and the family earns more than
$175,000 per year.70 “High rent vacancy” decontrol allows an
owner to remove an apartment when the rent is more than
$2,000 per month and the unit is vacant.71
However, the RRRA contains an exception: the luxury
decontrol provisions do not apply to housing “which became or
become subject to [the RRRA] . . . by virtue of receiving [J-51
tax benefits].”72 In 1996, due to confusion over this language,
DHCR issued an advisory opinion to clarify the luxury decontrol
law’s interplay with the J-51 benefit, stating that the “J-51

66

New York, N.Y., Code § 11-243 (2008); Hannah Fons & Amy
Blankstein, Taxing Questions: A Look at J-51 and 421-a Abatements,
COOPERATOR: COOP & CONDO MONTHLY, available at http://www.
cooperator.com/articles/1378/1/Taxing-Questions/Page1.html;
McPherson,
supra note 64, at 1148–49. J-51 was first created in 1955 as a means of
encouraging landlords to provide heat and hot water but has since expanded
to incentivize a much broader scope of renovation and rehabilitation. See
Fons & Blankstein, supra; see also Jahr, supra note 19. It has been used in
recent years as a means of quickly increasing rents towards the luxury
decontrol threshold. Id.
67
NYC Finance, J-51, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/property/
property_tax_reduc_j_51.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
68
History of the Board, supra note 62.
69
Id. In 1997, the legislature extended rent stabilization and made certain
modifications in the RRRA, but it did not modify the language at issue in the
Roberts case. Id. at 37–39; see infra text accompanying notes 73–79.
70
Final Word on Stuy Town, supra note 65, at 1.
71
Id.
72
Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 902 (N.Y.
2009) (quoting RSL § 26-504.1, 26-504.2[a]).
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program only precluded luxury decontrol ‘where the receipt of
such benefits is the sole reason for the accommodation being
subject to rent regulation.’”73
In 2000, DHRC amended RSC’s section 2520.11 in an effort
to again elucidate the manner in which the rent stabilization
scheme and the J-51 tax program interacted.74 The amended
section stated that luxury decontrol would not apply to housing
that “became or become subject to the RSL and this
Code . . . solely by virtue of [getting J-51 tax benefits].”75 Thus,
the question before the court in Roberts was whether the RSC’s
exception to luxury decontrol, as understood and administered
by DHCR, was the proper interpretation of the 1993 RRRA.76
The court was to determine what the language “became or
become subject to the RSL and this Code . . . by virtue of the
receipt of tax benefits” actually meant.77 The court considered
73

Id. at 903 (emphasis added by the court). The Appellate Division
explained, “[I]t is our opinion that their apparent meaning is synonymous to
‘by reason of’ or ‘because of,’ and that an owner is precluded from seeking
Luxury Decontrol of a housing accommodation receiving ‘J-51’ tax abatement
benefits only where the receipt of such benefits is the sole reason for the
accommodation being subject to rent regulation.” Roberts v. Tishman Speyer
Props., L.P., 874 N.Y.S.2d 97, 103–04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), aff’d, 918
N.E.2d 900 (N.Y. 2009).
74
See Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 903.
75
Id. (emphasis added by the court). The section reads, “[luxury
decontrol] shall not apply to housing accommodations which became or
become subject to the RSL and this Code: (i) solely by virtue of the receipt
of tax benefits pursuant to . . . section 11-243 (formerly J51-2.5) or section
11-244 (formerly J51-5) of the Administrative Code of the city of New York,
as amended.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11 (2000)
(emphasis added).
76
Id. at 904–05. One commentator summarized the question before the
court as follows: “The question posed by Roberts was whether a building
receiving J-51 benefits could also take advantage of the decontrol provisions.
The 1993 law was ambiguous on this point, and the state’s Division of
Housing and Community Renewal interpreted the law to say that only
buildings solely subject to rent regulation because of J-51 were prohibited
from opting out—as opposed to buildings which took advantage of J-51 but
were subject to rent regulation for other reasons.” Jahr, supra note 19.
77
Harold M. Shultz, Stuy Town J-51 Decision Reversed, INSIDE EDGE,
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two conflicting interpretations: either a building owner could not
benefit from luxury decontrol while receiving J-51 tax
exemptions or abatements; or a building owner could not benefit
from luxury decontrol while receiving J-51 benefits and where
the sole reason that the building was rent stabilized was because
the building had entered the J-51 program.78 This distinction is
important. Under the first view, any building receiving J-51
benefits could not simultaneously deregulate; under the second
view however, only buildings that became rent stabilized in
order to receive J-51 benefits would be prevented from
deregulation.79
C. Majority Opinion
The majority, finding for the Tenants, ruled the former to be
the correct legal interpretation—no owner, regardless of the
reason for becoming rent stabilized, was entitled to
simultaneously enjoy the benefits of New York City’s J-51
program and deregulation.80 The court first explained that it did
not owe deference to DHCR’s Rent Stabilization Law
interpretation.81 Then, the court outlined two essential bases for
its holding. First, the Owners’ luxury control exception
interpretation was not the most natural reading of the statute’s
language.82 The court wrote that “[c]ontrary to [the Owners’]
argument, there is nothing impossible, or even strained, about
reading the verb ‘become’ to refer to achieving, for a second

(Citizens Hous. & Planning Council, New York, N.Y.), March 2009,
available at http://www.chpcny.org/pubs/Stuy%20Town%20Decision%20
Reversed.pdf (quoting RSL § 26-504.1, 26-504.2[a]).
78
See Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 905.
79
Shultz, supra note 77.
80
Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 906.
81
Id. at 904 (“[When] the question is one of pure statutory reading and
analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent, there
is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the
administrative agency and its interpretive regulations . . . .” (quoting
Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 459 (1980))).
82
Id. at 906.
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time, a status already attained.”83
Second, the court looked to the legislative intent.84 Contrary
to the Owners’ contention, the court found that the legislature
did not intend to create two categories of buildings that would
benefit from the J-51 program.85 The court cited the bill
sponsor’s language and found that the RRRA’s legislative
history more accurately supports the Tenants’ reading.86 The
court reasoned that the legislative history, in light of the bill
sponsor’s statements, makes very clear that buildings receiving
tax exemptions such as J-51 benefits would never be allowed to
deregulate under the luxury decontrol provisions of the RRRA.87
The court also explained that the legislature’s failure to clarify
DHCR’s interpretation does not demonstrate acquiescence
because a legislature may be inactive for any number of
reasons.88
Just when it seemed the court had clarified that a landlord
could not simultaneously benefit from J-51 benefits while
83

Id.
Id.
85
Id. The Owners argued that the apartments that were stabilized before
getting J-51 benefits would be eligible for luxury decontrol and those that
only became stabilized as a condition of getting J-51 benefits would not be
eligible for luxury decontrol. Id.
86
Id. at 906–07 (“[S]hould the exemptions contained in section 489 end,
that—those J.51s and 489s end, then they would be subject so that at no point
do you have the [luxury] decontrol provisions applying to the buildings which
have received the tax exemptions that I just mentioned.” (quoting N.Y.
Senate Debate on Assembly Bill 8859, July 7, 1993, at 8213–16)).
87
Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 906–07. While Roberts was focused on the J51 program, it is unclear whether other tax benefit programs may fall within
the Roberts ruling given the court’s language: “The RRRA’s sponsor stated
that luxury decontrol was unavailable to building owners who ‘enjoy[ed]
another system of general public assistance” such as J-51 benefits . . . .” Id.
at 906.
88
Id. at 907. The court wrote that because the “practical construction”
here can’t be said to be well known, the legislature cannot be “charged with
knowledge of [a well-known] construction” such that the legislature’s inaction
could be deemed acquiescence. Id. The court noted as well that there is no
indication that the issue here was even considered the last time the legislature
considered the statute. Id.
84
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removing an apartment from rent regulation, the majority’s
concluding sentence reflects the legal ambiguity that remains:
“[The dire financial consequences the dissent predicts] may not
come true; they depend, among other things, on issues yet to be
decided, including retroactivity, class certification, the statute of
limitations, and other defenses that may be applicable to
particular tenants.”89 The majority then called on the legislature
to provide relief if the statute does ultimately impose such
“unacceptable burdens” on landlords in New York.90
D. The Dissent
The Roberts dissent aggressively challenged the majority’s
methods of statutory interpretation and warned of “significant, if
not severe dislocations in the New York City residential real
estate industry as a result of [the] decision.”91 First, the dissent
took issue with the majority’s statutory interpretation.92 Referring
to the words “became or become subject to this law (a) by
virtue of receiving J-51 benefits,” the dissent argued that if the
legislature “had intended for all buildings receiving J-51 tax
benefits to be exempt from luxury deregulation, it could have
easily said just that” and the court should assume that the words
used in a statute were inserted by the legislature for a reason.93
89

Id.
Id.
91
Id. at 912 (Read, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 907–09.
93
Id. at 908 (Read, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders v. Winship, 57 N.Y.
2d 391 (1982)) (“Under well-established principles of interpretation, effect
and meaning should be given to the entire statute and every part and word
thereof.”). Under the dissent’s comprehension of the statute’s plain meaning,
the court reasons that
the buildings that ‘became or become subject to [the RSL] by virtue
of’ receiving J-51 tax benefits passed from their former state
(unregulated) into a new state (rent-stabilized) because of their
owners’ receipt of these benefits. That did not happen here since the
apartment buildings comprising Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant
Town have been rent-regulated since at least 1974, 18 years before
any building in either complex is alleged to have received J-51
90
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Moreover, in the dissent’s view, even a generous reading of the
verb “become” to mean “achieving, for a second time, a status
already attained” makes the statutory terms ambiguous, certainly
not clearly wrong as the majority implied.94
Next, the dissent rebuts the majority’s interpretation of the
statute’s legislative intent.95 It charges the majority with
“pluck[ing] a snippet” from a Senate floor debate on the bill that
eventually became the RRRA, and cautions against making
conclusions based on such history.96 The dissent also points to
what it calls the “most important gauge of statutory meaning,”
which it faults the majority for failing to address at all: the
RRRA’s sunset clause, which mandates the legislature to
97
evaluate the statute’s terms. Given that the legislature reviewed
the statute twice since the DHCR released its advisory opinion
in 1996,98 it was indeed aware of the advisory decision and the
99
deregulation that followed from it. The dissent argued that
benefits.
They did not ‘become’ rent-stabilized by virtue of
receiving J-51 benefits; they already were rent-stabilized.
Id. (citing In re KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. &
Cmty. Renewal, 5 N.Y.3d 303 (2005) (“[O]nce a building became rentstabilized, later, redundant statutory routes ‘would not have [been] needed’ to
make the building subject to the RSL.”)).
94
Id. at 904 (Read, J., dissenting).
95
Id. at 910–12 (Read, J., dissenting).
96
Id. at 910 (Read, J. dissenting). The dissent asserts that Senator
Hannon’s response, which the majority uses to support their interpretation,
does not support the court’s holding. Id. at 910–11. Instead, taken in context
with Senator Mendez’s question, which referred only to buildings entering the
rent stabilization program for the first time as a condition of receiving J-51
benefits—Senator Hannon’s response did not even address buildings that
began receiving J-51 benefits after having already been subject to rent
stabilization, as Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village were. Id.
97
Id. at 911 (Read, J., dissenting).
98
Id. (Read, J., dissenting). The statute’s terms were reconsidered in
1997 and 2003 and are to be considered for renewal in 2011. Id.
99
Id. Pointing to DHCR’s adoption of a revised RSC, the dissent argues
that
the code made the DHCR’s interpretation of [the rent stabilization
law] unmistakably clear: the exception from luxury decontrol for
buildings receiving J-51 tax benefits covered only those buildings
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failing to amend a statute when the practical construction is clear
signals acquiescence on the legislature’s part.100
Lastly, the dissent bristles at the lack of deference shown to
DHCR’s interpretation, given its mandate to “promulgate
regulations in furtherance of the rent control and rent
stabilization laws.”101 The dissent writes:
While we may not owe deference to the administrative
agency, it should count for something that DHCR
adopted its interpretation as a formal regulation after a
notice-and-comment
rulemaking
enjoying
wide
participation by both landlord and tenant advocacy groups
and interests. If DHCR’s interpretation were as wide off
the mark as the majority claims, it is odd that this
infirmity was not discovered then.102
In its conclusion, the dissent adopts a tone protective of the
real estate industry and accuses the majority of minimizing
potentially far-reaching consequences for both the defendants
and New York City real estate industry.103 The dissent argues
that accepted industry practice and continuity matter in the real
estate industry and blames the majority for upsetting foundations
upon which many business transactions have been made.104 In
conclusion, the dissent warns that the impact of the decision will
be even more significant given the fragility of the real estate
market due to the housing bubble burst.105

rent-stabilized solely on this basis. Yet, the Legislature in 2003 did
not amend the RRRA to adopt the interpretation favored by
plaintiffs, although it otherwise modified the statute.
Id.
100

Id. at 911–12 (citing Matter of Ansonia Residents Assn. v. New York
State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 75 N.Y.2d 206 (N.Y. 1989);
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41
N.Y.2d 84, 90 (1976)).
101
Id. at 912.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 912–13.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 913.

SPIRER REVISED.DOC

6/28/2010 3:43 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

876

E. Evaluation of the Decision
The Roberts majority decided the case correctly, properly
interpreting the statute at issue through a linguistic and
legislative history analysis. It correctly decided not to address
issues that should be outside the scope of a judicial
determination, such as financial ramifications for the New York
real estate industry.106
First, the majority correctly decided that DHCR’s
interpretation should not be given deference, given that the issue
before the court was one of strict statutory interpretation.107 Case
law supports this decisively: “if the regulation runs counter to
the clear wording of a statutory provision it should not be
accorded any weight.”108 Here, DHCR inserted the word
“solely” where the legislature did not and therefore the
regulation conflicts with the statute. Mere dependency on
erroneous administrative interpretation is not a sound legal basis
to continue relying on that erroneous interpretation.109
Second, the language of the statute, while lacking clarity,
simply does not state that an apartment must become stabilized
solely by virtue of receiving tax benefits under the J-51
110
program, as DHCR later amends its interpretation to read.
Thus, DHCR acted beyond the scope of its authority in
essentially amending the statute.111 The Owners and the dissent
attempt to create a post hoc distinction where there is none.
There are no separate categories reflected in the remainder of
106

Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 905–06.
108
Id. (citing Kurcsics v. Merchant Mut. Ins. Co., 403 N.E.2d 159, 163
(N.Y. 1980)).
109
Jahr, supra note 19. According to an attorney for Legal Aid, who
submitted an amicus brief for the Tenants, “[i]f you read the statute, the
statute’s pretty clear. The fact that DHCR, at the urging of landlords, years
ago came out with a different position doesn’t mean the law as the legislature
enacted it changed its meaning.” Id.
110
See Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 905.
111
See id. In fact, the Owners concede that the word “solely” should not
have been inserted by basing their case on the “became or become”
language. Id.
107
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the statute dictating disparate treatment for apartments that
became stabilized because they received J-51 benefits and for
apartments that had already been subject to stabilization.112 The
dissent is selective in choosing when it follows a strict
interpretation of statutory language.113 In one instance, it argues
that each word has an exact meaning, explaining that the
legislature would have specified that all housing receiving J-51
benefits would be excluded from taking advantage of luxury
decontrol, not just those that receive benefits because they
received J-51 benefits.114 In another context, however, it excuses
language redundancy, arguing that DHCR’s inclusion of the
word “solely” was merely a redundancy in its regulations, not a
change to the statute’s meaning.115
The majority, however, appeared to stretch its logic to
accommodate its result. The court reasons, “there is nothing
impossible, or even strained, about reading the verb ‘become’ to
refer to achieving, for a second time, a status already attained”116
and in doing so ignores both the commonsense and definitional
meanings of “become.” This flawed logic is not necessary for
the court’s holding and should have been excluded. The “by
virtue of” and “solely by virtue of” distinction and the
legislative history of the statute provide a sufficiently strong
foundation for the court’s holding that this reasoning, which has
been criticized,117 was superfluous.
Third, the majority writes persuasively in its analysis of the
1993 RRRA legislative history. In citing the sponsor’s
unambiguous language during a Senate floor exchange, the
majority relies on the legislative source most likely to reflect the
112

See id. at 906.
See id. at 908–09.
114
See id. at 908.
115
See id. at 909.
116
Id. at 906.
117
See Posting of Lucas A. Ferrara to New York Real Estate Lawyers’
Blog,
http://www.nyrealestatelawblog.com/2009/10/what_do_you_think_
about_the_st.html (Oct. 23, 2009, 17:15 EST) [hereinafter NY Real Estate
Lawyers’ Blog Post] (criticizing the Court’s reasoning in the Stuy Town
Decision).
113
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statute’s intent.118 The dissent wrongly focuses on the
legislature’s inaction in the face of DHCR’s interpretation.
Contrary case law undermines this theory. “Legislative inactivity
is inherently ambiguous and ‘affords the most dubious
foundation for drawing positive inference’”119 Moreover, there is
no proof that this issue ever came to the legislature’s attention.120
Also, the dissent’s assumption that the issue in the Roberts case
would be considered in 1997 and 2003 simply because “battles
over rent stabilization are among the fiercest in Albany” is
unfounded.121 Finally, even the precedent the dissent cites
concedes the weakness of its acquisition argument: the case to
which the dissent cites merely calls legislative inactivity “some
additional evidence of [the legislature’s] intention.”122
Ultimately, the Owners and the dissent appear to put more
weight in the stability of the real estate industry than in the letter
of the law, and in doing so, argue that the Roberts decision is
inequitable because of landlords’ reliance on DHCR’s
interpretation of the statute.123 This argument is unpersuasive
because in making this argument, the Owners subjectively judge
the value of their potential loss to be greater than the loss
suffered by the tenants who paid rents based on a faulty
124
statutory interpretation. Ultimately, the majority’s focus on the
law—as opposed to financial consequences for the real estate
industry—provides the basis for an analysis and ruling that are
more legally sound.
118

See Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 906–07. The dissent’s efforts to expand
the context in order to clarify this exchange are not insignificant, but are far
from conclusive. Id.
119
Id. at 907 (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310–11
(1960)).
120
See id.
121
See id. at 911.
122
Engle v. Talarico, 306 N.E.2d 796, 799 (N.Y. 1973) (emphasis
added).
123
See Roberts, 913 N.E.2d at 912–13.
124
See Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 55 N.Y.2d 184, 193 (N.Y.
1982) (finding that the unfairness to the victims of an erroneously interpreted
statute outweighed the financial burden imposed on the party who had taken
advantage of that improper interpretation).
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III. THE ROBERTS DECISION’S IMPACT ON PREDATORY EQUITY
While the tenants claim victory, debate continues as to what
was actually won and whether or not tenants—at Stuy Town and
in rent regulated housing across the city—will actually be better
off after the Roberts decision. Clearly, the Roberts decision will
apply to all tenants in apartments that have been deregulated and
for which landlords are also receiving J-51 tax abatements.125
Experts believe that this holding will affect up to 90,000
apartments for which landlords simultaneously took advantage of
J-51 benefits and luxury decontrol.126 It is believed that 27,708
units that meet these criteria are in buildings that can be
classified as “predatory equity” buildings. In these buildings,
Roberts will certainly aid tenants facing aggressive—and now
illegal—deregulation.127
Yet, the true Roberts significance hinges on the possibility
that the decision will reverberate across an entire industry and
will ultimately lead to greater protections by the court or the
legislature for an even greater number of low and middleincome tenants. In other words, the decision will allow some
lucky tenants to receive an unexpected windfall—back rent for
the difference between the regulated rent and the market rate
charged128—or, at the very least, protect them from having to
pay market rate rents prospectively.129 The more important
question, however, is whether the decision will help protect
future tenants from predatory equity’s harmful effects.130
Additionally, it is unclear whether the decision signifies a
growing anti-owner/Wall Street investor trend among the
131
courts. Significantly, the Court of Appeals left much to be
125

Final Word on Stuy Town, supra note 65, at 1.
NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13, at 2. This is out of
354,084 units in 8,142 buildings that receive J-51 benefits. Final Word on
Stuy Town, supra note 65, at 3.
127
Jahr, supra note 19.
128
Final Word on Stuy Town, supra note 65, at 3.
129
Id. at 1.
130
Anderson, supra note 50.
131
NY Real Estate Lawyers’ Blog Post, supra note 117.
126
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determined on remand, leaving the decision’s implications for
the Stuy Town tenants still unknown.132
A. The Roberts Decision’s Conflicting Views
1. Broad Interpretation: The Decision will
“Chill” the Predatory Equity Market
Some believe the Roberts decision to be a landmark case133
with significant implications for the New York City market in
regulated rental housing. First, they believe that a broad
interpretation of the Roberts decision could lead to a “chilling”
effect on speculative purchases of multifamily housing because
the scope and application of this decision are so uncertain that
the practice of predatory equity is now too risky for private
equity-backed developers.134 Predatory equity success relies on
132

See David S. Hershey-Webb & William J. Gribben, In the Wake of
the ‘Roberts’ Decision, What’s Next?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 2009, at 4, col. 1.
A law firm bulletin described the potential implications of the decision: “In
addition, there may be disputes between present and prior landlords over
liability, mortgage defaults at affected buildings and diminished services. It
may take further litigation, regulatory action, or legislation to resolve such
issues.” See Special Bulletin: New York State Court of Appeals Issues
Decision in Stuyvesant Town/ Peter Cooper Village Case, Stroock & Stroock
& Lavan LLP 2 (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.stroock.com/
SiteFiles/Pub848.pdf [hereinafter Special Bulletin].
133
Press Release, City Council Member Dan Garodnick, Re: Roberts v.
Tishman Speyer Decision (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://stuytown
luxliving.com/2009/03/statement-from-council-member-garodnick-re-robertsv-tishman-speyer-decision.html.
134
Ilaina Jonas, Court Ruling May Cost NYC Apartment Owners Billions,
REUTERS, Nov. 30, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
bankruptcyNews/idUSN3036333920091201; Anderson, supra note 50. The
General Counsel to the Rent Stabilization Association has said that the
decision exposes so many possible liabilities in the residential rental real
estate market that there will be an immediate freeze in market activity.
Impact of Ruling, supra note 50. Some believe that a “chilled” market and
lack of competition will allow preservation purchasers—nonprofit
organizations committed to keeping the housing affordable, city agencies or
the tenants themselves—to acquire buildings and maintain their affordability,
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the use of deregulation mechanisms, such as luxury decontrol, in
order to remove apartments from the rent stabilization scheme
and charge market rate rents.135 If apartments that currently
allow owners to receive tax abatements are unable to be
deregulated, investors—ever cautious about investing in housing
that is, or may become, regulated—may be even less inclined to
invest in rent regulated housing.136
In other words, for tenants, the positive result of the Roberts
decision may be that real estate speculation on rent regulated
housing will decrease; a high court decision bolstering rent
regulation could discourage subsequent rounds of speculative,
overleveraged transactions in the residential rental housing
market.137 A prominent New York real estate brokerage firm
founder explains that “[w]hen an investor purchases a rent
controlled property, they usually do so with the expectation that
they’ll be able to convert a portion of the units to market
rents . . . . Now those expectations have been challenged. For a
lot of landlords, this case just eliminated their upside.”138 The
loss of this “upside” could have enormous implications for
developers who have used private equity to speculate on rental
housing; it means that those involved in the already risky
practice of predatory equity, who have purchased apartments
that benefit from J-51 benefits, may not deregulate those
apartments and charge market rents. Perhaps more importantly
is the possibility that this loss of “upside” will discourage
predatory equity transactions going forward.
although financing these purchases requires significant capital to which many
nonprofits, municipal agencies and low-income tenants may not have access.
Anderson, supra note 50.
135
ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., THE $20,000 STOVE:
HOW FRAUDULENT RENT INCREASES UNDERMINE NEW YORK’S AFFORDABLE
HOUSING 8 (2009), available at http://www.anhd.org/resources/the%20
$20,000%20stove%20report%20on1-40th%20rent%20increase%20fraud.pdf.
136
Daniel Geiger, Owners Scratch Their Heads As Tenants Beat the
System, REAL EST. WKLY., Oct. 28, 2009, at 3, 27, available at http://www.
masseyknakal.com/news/pdf/633924219561898750.pdf [hereinafter Tenants
Beat System] (emphasis added).
137
Id.
138
Id. (emphasis added).
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There is also the possibility that the scope of Roberts is not
necessarily limited to the 90,000 units that are eligible for J-51
benefits and have been deregulated, or even the 350,000 J-51
units that receive J-51 benefits.139 Even the Roberts court,
despite its focus on J-51 benefits and its related statutes,
acknowledged that the finding could apply to other types of tax
benefits.140 Courts may find that landlords received other tax
abatements improperly while taking advantage of deregulation.141
The case could have enormous implications on the number of
claims brought and therefore, the decision’s overall impact.142
Lenders and investors may also balk at the prospect of offering
funds for improvements with uncertainty around the owners’
ability to successfully recoup their investment.143 In fact, some
investors appear to have already been affected144 and the banking
industry has indicated that Roberts could affect as much as $5.8
billion in loans and deter investors from pursuing rent stabilized

139

See Anderson, supra note 50.
Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 906 (N.Y.
2009). The court writes, “[t]he RRRA’s sponsor stated that luxury decontrol
was unavailable to building owners who ‘enjoy[ed] another system of general
public assistance’ such as J-51 benefits.” Id.
141
See Special Bulletin, supra note 132, at 2. As Leonard Boxer, one of
the leading real estate lawyers in the city explained in this client bulletin:
The implications of this decision are likely to be far reaching, not
only for other landlords and tenants in a similar predicament, but
also for lenders, investors and for the residential real estate market
in general. While this decision deals only with J-51, entering into
any tax exemption program could significantly limit the use of your
property in ways that may not be predictable.
Id. (emphasis added).
142
Press Release, Harry Heching & Paul Watkins, Flash: New York
State’s Court of Appeals Holds Tax Breaks Preclude Rent Decontrol (Oct.
28, 2009), available at http://www.dwpv.com/en/17620_24362.aspx.
143
Impact of Ruling, supra note 50.
144
Sam Chandan, Investors and Stuy Town, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 28,
2009, available at http://neptune.observer.com/2009/commercial-observer/
investors-and-stuy-town#. The predatory equity model depends in large part
on securitization of the debt taken to finance the purchase. EVOLUTION OF A
CRISIS, supra note 24, at 12–13.
140
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properties in the future.145
In addition, the Roberts decision could suggest two judicial
trends as courts adjudicate disputes over transactions that were
executed at the height of the housing bubble. First, the Roberts
decision could signal a shift away from pro-landlord rent
regulation and deregulation rulings.146 The possibility that this
ruling was based, at least in part, on ideology—a disapproval of
private equity’s involvement in the New York rent regulated
housing market, for example—is certain to give private equitybacked developers pause before making similar ventures into the
regulated housing market.147 Second, the decision could
demonstrate the court’s willingness to disregard longtime
industry practices if a court believes that doing so is necessary
to reach the proper legal result, as it did here in invalidating
DHCR’s application of J-51 law.148 The court ignored the longheld and widespread view that DHCR’s interpretation was
legally correct149 and invalidated that interpretation with the
stroke of a pen.150 Consequently, developers and their counsel
could approach similarly structured real estate deals with much
greater caution than they did before the Roberts case was
decided.151 This fear adds to the shadow of uncertainty that
152
Roberts casts over the industry and market.

145

The Next Stuyvesant Town? Deutsche Bank Report Examines Fallout,
WALL ST. J. (Developments Blog), Dec. 1, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/
developments/2009/12/01/the-next-stuyvesant-town-deutsche-bank-reportexamines-fallout/ [hereinafter The Next Stuyvesant Town].
146
NY Real Estate Lawyers’ Blog Post, supra note 117.
147
The Next Stuyvesant Town, supra note 145.
148
Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 907 (N.Y.
2009). The court simply dismisses the claim that a longtime practice should
be upheld on the grounds that it is a longtime practice and that a change in
that practice will require parties to expend significant effort, expense and that
future litigation is certain. Id.
149
Tenants Beat System, supra note 136, at 3.
150
Jahr, supra note 19.
151
See Special Bulletin, supra note 132.
152
Id.
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2. Narrow Interpretation: The Roberts Decision
Will Have a Limited Effect on Predatory Equity
The Roberts decision also evokes the alternate view that the
court’s strict holding is likely to have only a negligible effect on
New York City’s predatory equity.153 In other words, the
decision appears to expressly impact only those property owners
who simultaneously took advantage of J-51 tax abatements and
deregulation.154 The ruling, therefore, is most likely limited to a
maximum of 90,000 apartments in New York City, less than
30,000 of which are in buildings considered to be predatory
equity purchases.155 While significant, such low numbers on their
own are not substantial enough to ward off future predatory
equity purchases, especially in light of the fact that now owners
can simply forego J-51 benefits and reap the great rewards of
156
deregulation.
In addition, under this narrow view it is very unlikely that
the Roberts decision foreshadows a broad, liberal, antiowner/investor trend on the part of courts. To the contrary, the
case is based strictly on an issue of statutory interpretation.157
153
154
155

Landlords will Survive Stuy-town Verdict, supra note 20.
Id.; see also Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3.
NEXT SUB-PRIME LOAN CRISIS, supra note 13 at 2; Jahr, supra note

19.
156

Assuming that the Stuy Town Tenants collect the $215 million they
wish to recover for back rent, Wei & Wotapka, supra note 20, at A3, the
Owners could have saved $181 million by simply foregoing the $24 million
they received as tax abatements through the J-51 program. See Charles V.
Bagli, Court Deals Blow to Owners of Apartment Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/nyregion/23stuy
town.html?_r=1. This math will likely deter like-minded property owners
from entering the J-51 program in the future.
157
See Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 906
(N.Y. 2009). The decision reads:
Here, we conclude that defendants’ interpretation of the exception to
luxury control for units that “became or become” subject to rent
stabilization . . . conflicts with the most natural reading of the
statute’s language . . . . Contrary to PCV/ST’s and MetLife’s
argument, there is nothing impossible, or even strained, about
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Given the ruling’s narrow language, courts will only be bound
by the decision when exclusively addressing the interplay of J-51
tax abatements and simultaneous deregulation.
This decision could simply be a product of its times; it did,
after all, come in the midst of a severe recession that followed
the greed and audacity of a boom time. If the justices were, in
fact, tinged by ideology, their holding is not likely to be applied
by future courts in such a manner that it becomes a truly
influential decision. Future courts will be vigilant to ensure that
their decisions are based on the law, not ideology.
B. Roberts’ Impact on Predatory Equity will be Negligible
Ultimately, the Roberts court’s narrow holding indicates that
this case, while significant, will not be instrumental in bringing
about the demise of predatory equity. As such, the case is a
source of false hope for those who believed that it would
represent a seismic shift in New York residential real estate law.
While the tenants in this case have prevailed against Stuy Town,
there are a number of reasons why the tenant movement should
not claim victory just yet.
First, despite speculation that this decision could chill the
predatory equity market temporarily,158 it does not appear to be
doing so.159 The narrow holding regarding just the J-51 program
does not appear to be deterring vulture investors seeking
distressed properties,160 and is not likely to prevent private equity
reading the verb “become” to refer to achieving, for a second time,
a status already attained. Even assuming that the reading given to
‘became or become’ by PCV/ST and MetLife is a possible one, the
RRRA’s legislative history better supports our interpretation of the
statute.
Id.
158

See supra Part III.A.1.
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 21. Instead, the banks
selling the debt seem to be waiting to determine the market value of the
buildings and loans so that they do not sell the assets for less than they could
soon be worth if the market ends up recovering. Id.
160
Id. Although they preceded the Roberts decision, there have been
recent sales of predatory equity properties to owners with histories of
159
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investors from getting involved again once the housing market
rebounds.161 Second, the ruling—which focuses almost
exclusively on statutory language and legislative intent—debunks
the notion that this decision reflects a new populist trend
whereby ideologically motivated judges will punish investors and
developers.162
Third, there are important socioeconomic differences
between Stuy Town residents and other predatory equity
building residents. The Roberts decision will not affect many
buildings that are predatory equity victims because the buildings
are located in neighborhoods where the rents are much less than
the $2,000 mark that allows owners to deregulate the unit.163
Thus, many predatory equity victims live in apartments that
have become more expensive, but have not been deregulated and
may not be for quite some time.164 Moreover, most of the
speculation and tenant harassment. Id. at 21. One example that worries tenant
advocates is a speculative purchase made by the Orbach Group of debt held
by Deutsche Bank in March, 2009 on overleveraged buildings owned by The
Pinnacle Group. Id.; see also Massey Knakal, Commercial Mortgage Alert,
Mar., 27, 2009, available at http://www.masseyknakal.com/news/pdf/
633737690628258682.pdf. The Association for Neighborhood and Housing
Development explains:
[I]t is our assessment that a 40 percent discount would leave the
building far less overleveraged, although still somewhat in excess of
the building’s actual income-based value. This suggests that the
lender, Deutsche Bank, now has a more realistic model of how rentregulated buildings in New York City should be underwritten.
However, there are grave concerns about the Orbach Group as
purchaser of the mortgage, as evidence suggests that it has a history
of managing buildings with the same speculative approach and
harassing tactics as the worst of the predatory equity developers.
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 21.
161
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 20.
162
Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 918 N.E.2d 900, 906–07
(N.Y. 2009).
163
WATERS & BACH, supra note 7, at 11.
164
Id. While the rent can be raised rapidly due to a 20% vacancy bonus
and the owner’s ability to charge one dollar more per month for every forty
dollars spent on improvements, in many cases, the rent will remain under
$2,000. Id.
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predatory equity victims are low-income tenants, unlike Stuy
Town’s middle-class tenants, and lack the political clout that
comes from living in such a famous, historic and symbolic
housing complex situated in the heart of Manhattan. Lowincome tenants may be more easily coerced into giving up their
legal rights and abandoning their homes due to financial
concerns, lack of knowledge of their rights or because of their
status as undocumented immigrants.165 Such tenants are less
likely to initiate expensive litigation like the Owners faced in
Roberts.
Fourth, there is a chance that the backlash from this wellpublicized case could prompt the New York State Legislature to
accept the Roberts court’s express invitation to amend the RSL
and essentially undo the Roberts decision.166 The decision invites
those it knew would be angered by its ruling to do so: “If the
statute imposes unacceptable burdens, defendants’ remedy is to
seek legislative relief.”167
Fifth, it is likely that property owners will simply forego the
benefits received through the J-51 program. Although these
benefits are not insubstantial, they pale in comparison to the

165

PRATT CTR. FOR CMTY. DEV. & N.Y. IMMIGRANT HOUS.
COLLABORATIVE, CONFRONTING THE HOUSING SQUEEZE: CHALLENGES
FACING IMMIGRANT TENANTS, AND WHAT NEW YORK CAN DO 16 (2008),
available at http://prattcenter.net/sites/default/files/publications/Confronting%
20the%20Housing%20Squeeze.pdf.
166
Richard A. Epstein, The Scourge of Rent Stabilization, FORBES.COM,
Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/02/rent-stabilization-tishmanspeyer-peter-cooper-stuyvesant-opinions-columnists-richard-a-epstein.html.
“[I]t is not as though the tenants have won anything tangible . . . for their
Pyrrhic victory guarantees only further litigation on such technical subjects as
class certification, measure of damages and statutes of limitation—unless of
course the state legislature accepts the Court’s invitation by undoing the
Roberts decision.” Id. Given the New York State Democrats’ current control
of the legislative and executive branches, such legislation is not, however,
likely to be imminent. See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, Espada Promises the Repeal
of Vacancy Decontrol and More, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 26, 2009, available
at
http://www.observer.com/2009/politics/espada-promise-repeal-vacancydecontrol.
167
Roberts, 918 N.E.2d at 907.
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money an owner stands to make from a deregulated apartment.168
Sixth, the decision could actually harm tenants at Stuy Town
and across the city more than it helps them.169 Many “predatory
equity” properties, including Stuy Town, are already debt-laden
and on the path toward foreclosure. This decision, and any
damages owners would be forced to pay, could actually make
conditions worse for tenants.170 “In the end, while the decision
may provide monetary benefits to tenants in the short run, it
may also prove to have a profoundly negative effect on the
buildings and neighborhoods in which the affected units are
located.”171 For example, there is a possibility that landlords will
168

Epstein, supra note 166.
Id.
170
Court Hands Stuy Town Tenants Huge Victory, supra note 21 (“‘This
decision is going to push building owners to the wall,’ said Patrick Siconolfi,
executive director of Community Housing Improvement Program, a group
that represents landlords. ‘And that’s not good for anybody, because we need
buildings to flourish for New York to flourish.’”). The impact of foreclosure
on renters is beyond the scope of this Comment, but has been addressed in
detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants:
Innocent Victims of the Nation’s Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1
(2009).
171
Special Bulletin, supra note 132. While this may be true, there is an
almost universal sentiment that predatory equity has caused many hardships
for—if not the complete displacement of—many tenants in these
neighborhoods, so it is difficult to evaluate which scenario is “worse.”
According to Joe Strasburg, president of the city’s Rent Stabilization
Association, which represents 25,000 owners of rent stabilized apartments:
This ruling leaves more questions unanswered than the questions it
addressed and, quite frankly, it raises new and alarming questions
for both owners and tenants . . . . This court decision has the
potential to force buildings into bankruptcy or foreclosure if owners
are required to roll back rents. This would not only create chaos in
the affordable housing industry, it would have a cascading
detrimental effect on the New York City budget because property tax
rolls would have to be adjusted lower—which would cripple an
already financially struggling City during this economic crisis.
Tenants Beat System, supra note 136, at 3, 27. Others have noted that the
ruling could decrease the city’s tax revenues given that landlords’ rent rolls
determine the amount they must pay in taxes. Court Hands Stuy Town
Tenants Huge Victory, supra note 21.
169
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decide to simply avoid necessary renovations now that a
significant incentive—the J-51 abatement—would preclude the
significant benefits of deregulation.172
IV. CONCLUSION
There are a number of deterrents for future predatory equity
investments in New York City: newly enacted tenant protection
legislation, an active, organized and vocal tenant-rights
movement with increasing success fighting harassment, elected
officials who are willing to expend political capital fighting this
battle for their constituents, the burst of the housing bubble, the
pending crisis in the commercial mortgage-backed securities
markets and now the Roberts decision and its impact in
hastening the downfall of the most prominent and expensive real
173
estate deals in history. In fact, the Roberts decision impacts
about one-third of all units in predatory equity buildings.174 Yet,
despite all of these deterrents, activity in the market for
predatory equity properties continues, albeit in a slightly more
moderate form.175 In other words, the deterrents, including
Roberts, are insufficient; the persistence of predatory equity
demonstrates the belief, on the part of investors and developers,

172

Court Hands Stuy Town Tenants Huge Victory, supra note 21. “‘It
renders J-51 tax benefits useless,’ said David Kuperberg, chief executive of
Cooper Square Realty, the city’s largest residential property manager, a firm
that also has an ownership stake in about a dozen buildings with rent
stabilized-units in the city. ‘It is a disincentive for landlords to upgrade
properties.’” Id.
173
See WATERS, supra note 8.
174
Jahr, supra note 19. According to Jahr’s article, 27,708 of the 90,000
apartments that have been purchased through a predatory equity model have
been deregulated while the owner has simultaneously received J-51 benefits.
Id. Even this high percentage of impacted units does not appear to be
deterring future investors from making purchases in this sector. See id.
175
See EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS, supra note 24, at 21. Note that this
activity preceded the Roberts Court of Appeals decision but followed the
Appellate Division decision. Therefore, the potential for such a holding has
been clear to the developers continuing to pursue predatory equity deals.
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that such deals are not only rational, but profitable.176
The second, more “moderate” phase of predatory equity is
characterized by more moderate overleveraging, but
overleveraging nonetheless. While the implications of the
economic slump and the Roberts ruling have yet to fully emerge,
it seems clear that investors are still willing to buy distressed
properties at a discount in the hopes of using predatory equity
strategies to turn a profit. The Roberts decision’s narrow holding
appears to have done very little to thwart such efforts.
Ultimately, legislation, political pressure and market forces
may actually pose a much greater threat to predatory equity
investment than any court decision. There are numerous bills
pending in state legislatures that could prevent predatory equity
investment more effectively than the Roberts decision by
strengthening rent regulation and, thus, removing the benefit of
investing in regulated housing with the intention of someday
charging market rents.177 Federal legislation has also been
introduced to curb new predatory equity purchases and to soften
existing deals’ harmful impacts on tenants and banks.178 New
York City recently announced a “Predatory Equity Task Force”
to “respond to foreclosures around the city, and find creative
new policies to prevent problems before they escalate.”179
176

See id. at 20–22.
See, e.g., A02005, Assem. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.
state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A02005 (proposing to repeal provisions of luxury
decontrol); A02002, Assem. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.state.
ny.us/leg/?bn=A02002 (proposing to increase civil penalties for types tenant
harassment); A01688 Assem. (N.Y. 2009), available at http://assembly.state.
ny.us/leg/?bn=A01688 (proposing to repeal the Urstadt Law); A00860,
Assem., (N.Y. 2009) (proposing to increase the threshold levels for luxury
decontrol to account for inflation), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/
leg/?bn=A00860.
178
TARP for Main Street Act of 2009, H.R. 3068, 111th Cong. (2009),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.3068:.
179
Press Release, Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., Mayor Bloomberg,
Senator Schumer, Congressman Serrano, Speaker Quinn and Fannie Mae
Announce Housing Developer Led by Mo Vaughn Will Purchase Troubled
South Bronx Housing Portfolio (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.nyc.
gov/html/hpd/html/pr2009/pr-12-02-09.shtml. It seems unlikely, however,
177
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Finally, the financial meltdown exposed systemic problems in
the commercial mortgage backed securities market that could
hinder deals of this magnitude from being made.180 These forces
could confront predatory equity much more effectively than the
judiciary ever could.
The Roberts decision is significant because it demonstrates
the ability of tenants to make current owners account for rent
overcharges and to deter investors from using an already-risky
investment strategy. Other tenants and their lawyers have
already used the Roberts decision as a basis for claims, and
more claims will certainly follow.181 Unfortunately for tenants
that this task force will have the mandate to implement any significant
prophylactic measures; takings clause and contract challenges are legal
hurdles for policy makers and tenant advocates whose ideal solution would be
to guarantee that purchasers of multifamily rental housing be committed to
maintaining affordability. See Maria Cristiano Anderson, Solutions to the
Crisis in Affordable Housing: A Proposed Model for New York City, 3
RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 84 (2005); Nat’l Hous. Law Project, A Brief
Review of State and Local Preservation Purchase Laws, 36 HOUSING L.
BULL. 217, 223 (2006), available at http://www.nhlp.org/files/Pres%
20Purchase%20Rts%20(Nov%20Dec%2006).pdf.
180
Sam Chandan, Investors and Stuy Town, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 28,
2009, available at http://neptune.observer.com/2009/commercial-observer/
investors-and-stuy-town#.
Given the struggling commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
market, it is unclear whether predatory equity deals of the magnitude made
during the housing bubble could even be executed. Chandan explains:
Apart from the specifics of last week’s decision, a default of the
magnitude and visibility of the Stuyvesant Town loans bears
implications for a broader class of investors’ perceptions of risk in
holding CMBS exposure.
...
Confounding efforts to rebuild confidence in securitization, many
investors will view a prospective default at Stuyvesant Town as a
result of systemic issues in the CMBS market that have yet to be
properly addressed, and not just as an asset-specific issue.
Id.
181
Theresa Agovino, Big Development Hit with Stuy-Town Ruling
Fallout, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Nov. 16, 2009, available at http://www.
crainsnewyork.com/article/20091116/FREE/911169987 (noting that 11
tenants at a building complex called London Terrace Gardens recently sued
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and their advocates, investors continue to seek investment
opportunities in the regulated residential real estate market,
albeit with a modified and slightly more realistic model. The
Roberts decision will certainly add to New York State’s
“impenetrable thicket” of rent laws, but it does not impose
significant enough burdens on landlords and developers to
precipitate the demise of predatory equity.

their landlord on the same grounds the plaintiffs used in Roberts; the lawyer
for the tenants has said that he is working on filing suits on these grounds in
other buildings as well).

